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OneShare/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control
ABSTRACT
A corporation's securities provide the holder with particular claims on the
firm's income stream and particular voting rights.These securities can be
designed in various ways: one share of a particular class may have a claim to
votes which is disproportionately larger or smaller than its claim to income.
In this paper we analyze some of the forces which make it desirable to set up
the corporation so that all securities have the same proportion of votes as
their claim to income ("one share/one vote").
We show that security structure influences both the conditions under
which a control change takes place and the terms on which it occurs. First,
the allocation of voting rights to securities determines which securities a
party must acquire in order to win control.Secondly, the assignment of
income claims to the same securities determines the cost of acquiring these
voting rights. We will show that it is in shareholders' interest to set the cost
of acquiring control to be as large as possible, consistent with a control
change occurring whenever this increases shareholder wealth. Under certain
assumptions, one share/one vote best achieves this goal.
We distinguish between two classes of benefits from control:private
benefits and security benefits.The private benefits of control refer to
benefits the current management or the acquirer obtain for themselves, but
which the target security holders do not obtain. The security benefits refer
to the total market value of the corporation's securities. The assignment of
income claims to voting rights determines the extent to which an acquirer
must face competition from parties who value the firm for its security benefits
rather than its private benefits.
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1.1INTRODUCTION
A corporation's securities provide the holder with particular claims on
the firm's income stream and particular voting rights. These securities can
be designed in various ways: one share of a particular class may have a claim
to votes which is disproportionately larger or smaller than its claim to
income. In this paper we analyze some of the forces which make it desirable
to set up the corporation so that all securities have the same proportion of
votes as their claim to income ("one share/one vote").
Although the literature has emphasized that there are agency problems
created by the delegation of control to management, it has not established
that a one share/one vote security structure is the solution to these
problems. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel write "As the residual
claimants, the shareholders are the group with the appropriate incentives
(collective choice problems to one side) to make discretionary decisions"
(1983, p.403).1" In practice, of course, as Easterbrook and Fischel
recognize, collective choice problems cannot be left to one side, and it is
presumably for this reason that shareholders delegate many discretionary
decisions to management. This delegation creates a conflict of interest
between those who make decisions and those who bear the consequences, which
may be mitigated by giving management a claim to the firm's profit. Note,
however, that this agency problem does not bear directly on the security—vote
structure; it implies only that management should receive performance—based
compensation. It is also clear that while shareholders collectively have an
incentive to monitor management —-andhence tieing votes to shares may be
desirable to allow them to act on this incentive -—suchmonitoring is likely
to be effective only when a single party becomes large enough to overcome
collective choice problems.2" We are thus led to explore how a firm's
security structure affects the market for corporate control.2
We show that security structure influences both the conditions under
which a control change takes place and the terms on which it occurs. First,
as is fairly clear, the allocation of voting rights to securities determines
which securities a party must acquire in order to win control. Secondly, the
assignment of income claims to the same securities determines the cost of
acquiring these voting rights. We will show that it is in shareholders'
interest to set the cost of acquiring control to be as large as possible,
consistent with a control change occurring whenever this increases shareholder
wealth. Under certain assumptions, one share/one vote best achieves this
goal.
We distinguish between two classes of benefits from control: private
benefits and security benefits. The private benefits of control refer to
benefits the current management or the acquirer obtain for themselves, but
which the target security holders do not obtain. These include synergy
benefits realized by the acquirer, perquisites of control, and in extreme
cases the diversion of resources from the security holders to subsidiaries of
management or the acquiror. The security benefits refer to the total market
value of the corporation's securities.
The assignment of income claims to voting rights determines the extent
to which an acquirer must face competition from parties who value the firm for
its security benefits rather than its private benefits. For example, in the
absence of competition from another buyer with private benefits, a voting
claim with no dividend rights will be tendered by a security holder to an
acquirer at any positive price. The vote holder would fail to tender at such
a price only if the acquirer faced competition, but the only potentially
profitable source of competition for pure votes would come from another party
with private benefits. In contrast, if dividend rights are tied to voting
claims, some competition can come from parties with only security benefits of3
control.
Through this competition effect, the allocation of voting rights
influences whether control will rest in the hands of a high private benefit
party or a high security benefit party, and it also determines the value of
income claims under the management of the controlling party. These effects
taken together represent the "allocative" role of the assignment of claims.
The assignment of claims also determines the price that the acquirer must pay
to vote holders for the private benefits of control, and this we call the
"surplus—extraction" role.
1.2STRUCTURE OF PAPER AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Section 2 presents the basic framework of an entrepreneur who desires to
set up a corporation with a voting structure which maximizes the total market
value of securities issued. The corporate charter specifies the share of
dividends and the share of votes to which each security class has a claim. It
also specifies the fraction of votes a party must acquire to effect a control
change, which we denote by "alpha". The charter is set up with the
expectation that the corporation's securities will become widely held, and in
the belief that incumbent management cannot be relied upon to oversee future
changes in control and in particular to fire itself if a superior management
team becomes available (i.e. agency problems will exist). It is also supposed
that incumbent management will receive the support of all small security
holders.3'1 Thus alpha =.5refers to the situation where there is majority
rule and an acquirer must purchase 50% of the votes in order to take
control.41
Sections 3 and 4 consider a class of cases where a single buyer desiring
control will appear with private and security benefit characteristics which
are drawn randomly from a population which is known at the time the charter is4
written. In order to focus on the allocative role of the voting structure,
these sections assume that the buyer faces competition only from parties with
no private benefit (we refer to these as arbitrageurs). Further, the parties
who compete against the buyer cannot negotiate directly with him for a share
of his private benefit. We establish that a one share/one vote security
structure is optimal. It is also proved that, in the absence of resistance by
the incumbent, it is optimal to set alpha =1,i.e., an acquirer should be
required to purchase 100% of the company to get control.
Section 5 explores situations where the buyer faces resistance from a
party representing incumbent management, who also derives private benefits
from control. Under these conditions the "surplus—extraction" role of shares
can be important. As a result it may be desirable to assign
disproportionately low income claims to the votes, so as to encourage the
incumbent to compete strongly for the votes in situations where he cannot
compete strongly for the dividend claims because they are worth much more
under the buyer's control. An extreme case of this is where votes are
assigned no dividend rights. Then, if the buyer's private and security
benefits are higher than the incumbent's, the buyer wins control, but he must
do so by paying a higher price than under one share/one vote where the
incumbent's competition against the buyer would be ineffective. If this were
the only type of situation, the optimal charter would deviate from one
share/one vote. Of course, the allocational role can conflict with the
surplus—extraction role, since shifting dividend claims away from voting
claims may cause a bidder with lower security benefits to win control.
Section 5 also explores the optimal voting rule. Once the resistance of
the incumbent is taken into account it is no longer optimal to have a charter
which requires that a bidder purchase 100% for control. In particular,
setting alpha above .5 makes it easier for the incumbent to use his private5
benefit to resist the buyer than it is for the buyer to use his private
benefit to gain from the acquisition. For example with alpha =.9,the buyer
must get just over 90% to achieve control. On the other hand, the incumbent,
by purchasing 10% of the votes, can prevent the buyer from taking control.
This makes it more likely that the incumbent can maintain control since he can
afford to spend his private benefit concentrated on only 10% of the voting
securities.
The tradeoffs discussed above are complicated, and do not lead to simple
conclusions about security structure or voting rules. However, under the
assumption that the buyer's private benefit is likely to be small relative to
the incumbent's, we prove that one share/one vote and alpha =.5(majority
rule) is optimal. Further, if the buyer's private benefit is likely to be
small (though not necessarily relative to the incumbent's), and the likelihood
of both private benefits being simultaneously large can be ignored, then one
share/one vote is optimal, though majority rule may not be (however, alpha < 1
is optimal).
Section 6 considers a different model of competition. In this model a
party (the "arbitrageur") can purchase a block of shares which the buyer needs
to attain control. The party than negotiates with the buyer and sells the
block needed for control to the buyer in return for a share of the buyer's
benefit from control. This model allows a broader understanding of the
determinants of u.Inparticular it is proved that it is optimal for the
charter either (a) to make hostile acquisitions impossible (which corresponds
to alpha =1in this section), or (b) to make alpha a number between 1/2 and
1, wheredepends on the ratio of the buyer's private benefit to the net
social gain from a control change. Further in case (b) alpha should be close
to 1/2 when the buyer's private benefit is small.6
1.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DEVIATIONS FROM ONE SHARE/ONE_VOTE
Our theoretical results can be further clarified by reference to
empirical evidence rndeviationsfrom one share/one vote. First, our model
assumes that securities are widely held, and that the market for corporate
control is the important factor in allocating control. We thus have nothing
to say about the much more complicated specific control agreements which are
used in closely held Second,since until very recently one
share/one vote was a requirement for listing on the New York Stock Exchange,
it is necessary to look elsewhere for widely held companies with different
voting structures.
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985, p.39) identified 78 publicly traded
companies on the American Stock Exchange and the Over the Counter Market (out
of a universe of thousands of companies), which had classes of securities with
differing voting rights. They found that where there was a deviation from one
share/one vote, in a majority of cases it had the effect of giving the
"incumbent" enough votes so that a change in control was impossible without
his approval. That is, this is a situation corresponding to alpha =1in
Section 6. In particular, the observed deviation from one share/one vote did
not create a situation where widely held securities had differing effective
voting rights; instead it created a situation where the incumbent had all the
effective votes necessary to maintain control. In the model of Section 6 this
can occur when the benefits of preventing value—decreasing hostile control
changes outweigh the costs of preventing value—increasing control changes.
In Sections 5 and 6, we emphasize that when private benefits are small
relative to security benefits, it will be the case that one share/one vote and
alpha < 1 are optimal. Empirically, private benefits are, in most cases,
forced to be small by.the fiduciary responsibility of management, and by the
6/
minority shareholders' appraisal remedy. The former often prevents7
management from extracting significant private benefits, and the latter can
prevent an acquirer from doing the same thing.7" The DeAngelo and DeAngelo
study suggests that when there is a deviation from alpha <1and one share/one
vote, it is for the purpose of maintaining family control over an enterprise.
Presumably in such cases the family receives significant private benefits from
control.8' If the private benefits were small the family would find it in its
interest to allow the market to determine control changes, and be rewarded for
these benefits by a compensation agreement which paid it following a change in
control. However, because the private benefits are large, the family prefers
a charter which makes hostile bids impossible.9' We therefore believe that
DeAngelo and DeAngelo's findings are consistent with our theoretical results
about optimal security structure. That is, though deviations from one
share/one vote occasionally occur, they do so in situations where our model
suggests they should.8
2. THE MODEL
We suppose the following stylized scenario. We imagine that the
corporate charter creates various classes of shares, with possibly
disproportionate voting rights. We assume that the charter is written by an
entrepreneur who desires to maximize the total market value of securities
issued. Since incumbent management cannot be relied upon to oversee future
changes in control the charter builds in a process for replacing management;
in particular, it specifies that a person who receives a fraction u of all the
corporation's votes in an election can replace existing management, wherec
1.1/ It further specifies a number of security classes, n, and the
fraction of total votes v.P, and the share of dividends s., to which theth
security class is entitled.2'
To simplify matters, we suppose that in the normal course of events each
of the firm's securities is in the hands of a large number of small investors
(i.e., the corporation is widely held), all of whom vote in favor of incumbent
management. This situation changes on the occasion of a control contest.
Then someone seeking control, whom we call the "buyer", and perhaps also a
resisting group representing either management or an arbitrageur, may become
large to influence a subsequent vote.
We assume that in order to become large, a party must make a public
tender offer. The form of the bid we consider is an unconditional, restricted
(i.e., partial) offer. That is, the bidder will offer to buy up to a fraction
f. of security i at a price of p. per 100% of class i, and he will prorate
1
equallyif more than f. is tendered. For example, if he makes an offer for 50
shares at a price of $1 per share fora particular class and 100 shares are
tendered from that class, then half of the shares tendered by each investor
are returned1 and the bidder pays out a total of $50.9
Let y' be the market value of the total income stream accruing to all
the firm's security holders under the management of the incumbent, and let
be that value under the management of the buyer. We shall suppose that
control can provide benefits to management over and above those received by
the firm's security holders. The buyer's firm may obtain synergy benefits
from running the corporation, and/or it may be able to freeze out minority
shareholders at a value which is below yB; or the buyer might be a person who
derives benefits from the perquisites associated with control. Let denote
the present value of the flow of private control benefits. Similarly,
incumbent management may derive control benefits, which we denote by z'.
At the time the corporate charter is written, the market recognizes that
the incumbent's characteristics (y',z') cannot be known far into the future.
The same is true of the characteristics of potential buyers The
charter thus creates a mechanism which will be expected to work well in
allocating control, averaging over the future random occurrences of (y1,z')
and (yBzB)We focus on how the assignment of voting rights in the charter
affects the allocation of management and shareholder benefits due to control
changes ."
Inthe scenario described above, the assignment of voting rights affects
shareholder welfare by influencing the price which must be paid for control.
The reason is that the price a buyer must pay for votes will depend on the
value of the votes to others, which in turn is affected by the share of firm
income tied to the votes. Thus, the assignment of votes to shares will
influence the degree of competition in the market for control. We develop
this point below, starting from the simplest case of no competition.10
3. NO COMPETITION -_THE CASE OF A SINGLE BUYER
Assume that a bidder of type (yB,zB) contemplates taking control of the
target, and there is no other party who can make a tender offer. First,
consider the case where there is one share/one vote and only one class of
securities, i.e. s1 =v1
=1,and a control shift requires a majority of the
votes, i.e.=.5.Consider an extreme situation where y' =100,z' =o,
=,= 1,i.e., under incumbent management the firm is worth 100, while
under control of the buyer the firm's shares would be worth 3. Clearly, the
shareholders do not want this buyer to get control and indeed there is good
reason to blieve that he won't under one share/one vote. In particular, the
most that the buyer is willing to pay for the 50% required to obtain control
•lB B lB is y +z=2.5,composed of a value of y =1.5from the shares purchased
plus z3 =1which is the private benefit from control. However, this
translates into a price of 5 per 100%, and at this price B's tender offer
could fail. This is because the shares under the incumbent are worth 100, and
so any shareholder who thinks that the bid will fail does not tender his
shares, correctly forecasting that he will obtain 100 rather than the 5
offered by the buyer.4"
Next, contrast the above outcome with what would occur if the charter
had two classes of shares. Let class 1 have all of the votes and 1% of the
income claims, while class 2 has no voting rights and 99% of the income
claims, i.e., s1 =.01,V1= 1,
S2= .99,
V2= 0.Now the market values of
the income from the securities under the incumbent are s1y1 =1for class 1,
and s2y =99for class 2. The value of class 1 under the buyer is s1y =
.03.Let the buyer make an offer for all of class 1 at a price per 100% of
1.01. Each shareholder of class 1 will tender his shares since 1.01 is larger
than the value of holding shares under either the incumbent or the buyer.
Hence, this bid is successful. Moreover, since the bid yields the buyer a11
total benefit of 1.03 (composed of =1plus the income from the class 1
shares of .03), which exceeds the cost of the bid, 1.01, this is a profitable
takeover bid.(It is not the most profitable takeover bid, however. We shall
see in the next section that B can increase his profit by making a restricted
offer for 50% of the voting shares.)
The point is that creating a class of shares with disproportionately
high voting rights lowers the cost of obtaining control. The reason is that
while the security income benefits to the buyer of obtaining control are
reduced, the private benefits are not. Shareholders are implicitly competing
against the buyer by being unwilling to part with their votes unless they are
compensated for the dividend claims that are associated with the votes.
However, since the buyer receives a private benefit from control, he is
willing to pay more per vote than a vote is worth to a single shareholder.
These ideas can be clarified and developed further by strenghtening the
definition of shareholder competition to include the possibility that a
shareholder can become an arbitrageur and explicitly make a counter bid to
block the buyer.This is the topic of the next section.5"
4. COMPETITION FROM AN ARBITRAGEUR
We suppose that the arbitrageur, A, is someone with a very small initial
holding of some security i in the company, and so has an interest in ensuring
that this security's value is preserved. However, the arbitrageur is supposed
to get no other private benefit from maintaining the status quo, i.e. =o.
Hence we assume that A only enters the competition if he can defeat the buyer
B without making losses on the shares he purchases. We shall also suppose
that each security i =1,...,n includes among its investors someone who will
act as an arbitrageur to defend that security's value; we use A to refer to a
general arbitrageur.12
We now require that the buyer's bid be such that it deters entry by any
arbitrageur. The buyer's offer specifies the price per share p and the
fraction he is willing to accept fB for each security class
Obviously deterrence by A is an issue only if B's bid would succeed in
the absence of any opposition. The condition for this is
(4.1) f v. ￿,ii
wherethe summation is over all security classes i with pB The point
is that, if p <s1y3,
no (negligible) class i shareholder who expects B to
win will tender, since he will reason that he can obtain SY3 by holding on to
his shares.6"
Definition. Let B make a bid b8 = p3; f,..., f) which satisfies
(4.1). We say that this deters A if, either
B B I B B 33
(4.2) For all i,ifs,y >p1,then s1y3 ￿s1y




(4.3) there does not exist a counter bidbA by A, such that in the resulting
contest between bB and bA there is an equilibrium where A wins and does
not lose money on securities purchased.
(4.2) states that the buyer's offer raises (or keeps the same) the value
of each security class, in which case A has no incentive to block B since he
benefits from the bid. (Note that we ignore the possibility that A acquires a
large voting block with the intention of negotiating later with B over a
transfer of control; this is the focus of Section 6, however.) Ifp3 <13
no class i holder, expecting B to win, tenders his shares and so the market
value is 5B• On the other hand, if B syB, all class i holders,
expecting B to win, tender their shares, which are prorated so that a fraction
are accepted and a fraction (1—f) are returned (the latter having value
syB). Thus f p3 +(1—f3)s.y3 is the post announcement price in this case.
(4.3) says that, while A might like to block B, doing so is too costly.
The condition refers to an equilibrium when there are competing bids. The
basic idea behind this equilibrium is that security holders have rational
expectations about the outcome of the contest and tender to the bidder who
offers the highest rate of return, where account is taken of other people's
tender decisions and hence of the take—up rate on tendered securities. It is
supposed that B Z3, y', z' are common knowledge at the time of the contest
(any uncertainty about these variables has been resolved by then). It is also
assumed that each security holder is negligible in the sense that he ignores
his influence on the outcome of the contest. A formal definition of this
equilibrium is deferred to the Appendix; however, we shall give an informal
discussion as we proceed, which should be sufficient for an appreciation of
(4.3) .7/
The following Lemma, proved in the Appendix, is useful.
Lemma 1: Given competing offers by two parties the equilibrium profit which
either party can make from its offer is no larger than the private benefit it
receives from running the company; no of feror makes profit from the price
appreciation of the shares he purchases.
This is a variant of the free—rider problem discussed in Grossman—Hart
(1980): a winning bid must be at a sufficiently high price that no
shareholder, and thus no bidder, can expect shares to appreciate in value
after the offer is consummated.14
In order to analyze the effects of arbitrage resistance, consider first
the case where y8 ￿y',i.e. control by B would be value-increasing for
security holders. Then (4.2) is automatically satisfied, and so A will not
block any bid by B. One winning bid that B could make is an unrestricted
offer for each security i at price syB per 100%. It is then an equilibrium
for everyone to tender to B (security holders are indifferent between
tendering and holding on; however B could always offer slightly more than s1y3
to ensure that they tender). B's profit will be z3, and. so we know from Lemma
1 that there is no way of getting control for B which is more profitable.8"
The total return to security holders in this event will be y3.
BI. he case where y <yis more complicated and itisuseful to consider
first some examples. Suppose y1 =100,y8 =80and there is one share/one
vote and majority rule (u= .5).Suppose first that B tried to get control as
above by making an unrestricted offer for the shares at =80(or just
above). Without opposition by A, there is again an equilibrium in which B is
expected to win, everybody tenders to B, and B does win. This is the
equilibrium described in footnote 4 of Section 3.(There is also an
equilibrium in which B is expected to lose, nobody tenders and.B loses.) Now,
however, shareholder return will fall from 100 to 80, and so A has an
incentive to block this bid. In fact he can do so costlessly by making his
own unrestricted offer at 100. With these two offers on the table, the only
equilibrium is where A wins; for if B is expected to win, tendering to A
dominates either tendering to B or holding on (which yields 80); this means
that A will get all the votes and so B cannot win.9"
How can B win in this case? One possibility is for B to make an
unrestricted offer at 100. A has no interest in blocking thissince he does
not face a capital loss if B gets control. Such a strategy is, however, very
expensive for B. If B is expected to win, everybody will tender to B (since15
holding on yields 80), which means that B incurs a loss of 100 —80=20from
the tender offer.
There is a cheaper strategy for B to adopt: B can make a restricted
offer at just above 100 for 50% of the shares. B still makes a capital loss
on this offer, but it is reduced to (100—80) =10.Note that this offer, if
unopposed, causes the value of the firm to fall from 100 to(100) +(80)=
90since all shares will be tendered to B, B will pay 100 on half of them and
the remainder, which are returned, will be worth 80. A would therefore like
to block this offer, but the problem is that the most he is prepared to offer
for the shares is 100 per 100% (since he gets no private benefit from
control). If A counters with this bid, however, he will lose. The point is
that shareholders will want to tender their shares to both A and B, but it
cannot be a rational expectations eujljbrjum for A to get more than 50%; the
reason is that if a shareholder expected B to get less than 50%, he would
anticipate no prorationing of his shares by B, and he (and all other
shareholders) would tender to B to get a price above 100 instead of 100 from
A.10'
So B can get control with the restricted offer described above. In fact
Proposition 1 below shows that this is the cheapest way for B to get control.
Of course, given B's capital loss on the shares purchased, he will only make
this bid if his private benefit B > 10.
It is useful to contrast the above outcome with what would happens if
there were two classes of shares. Suppose each class has 50% of the income
1 claims, but only class 1 has votes (i.e.s1 =s2
=, v1
=1,V20).
Similar arguments to the above show that the cheapest way for B to get control
is to make arestrjcted offer for 50% of the class 1 shares at a price equal
to s1y' =.5(100)per 100% (see Proposition 1 below). B continues to make a16
capital loss, but this is reduced to .5 (.5(100) —.5(80))=5since B only
has to buy up 25% of the total profit stream. Hence B will win control more
often than under one share/one vote; in fact whenever >5.Also in the
events where B does win control, the market value of the firm is .5(.5(100)) +
(1—.5(.5(80)))=85,which is lower than the value of 90 under one share/one
vote (again because B has to buy up only 25% of the profit stream at 100) .We
see then that dual class stock has two disadvantages relative to one share/one
vote: it more readily attracts inferior buyers (those with B< y; and an
inferior buyer causes a greater decline in market value.
B I
Let us now return to the general case y <yand an arbitrary security
structure. As in the above example, one way for B to get control is to make
an unrestricted offer at s1y' for each security i (A has no interest in
blocking this). This costs B: y' —y3.Again, however, there are cheaper
strategies for B to adopt (if <1).The following lemmas, established in
the Appendix, are useful.
Lemma_2: No deterring bid by B that increases or keeps the same each
security's value (i.e., where (4.2) holds) is cheaper than an unrestricted
offer at sy' for each security i.
So, a cheaper strategy for B must reduce the price of some security, but deter
A via condition (4.3).
Lemma 3: The most effective form of resistance by A is to make an
unrestricted offer at sy' for all i. Hence, to deter A, B's bid must win
against this offer. That is, if B <y',a necessary and sufficient condition
for the buyer's bid to satisfy (4.3) is that in a contest matching this bid
-A I I
with the unrestricted b =(s1y,...,sy; 1,..., 1) by A, every17
equilibrium has enough securities tendered to B so that he wins (i.e., has at
leastvotes).
In the Appendix, we use these results to prove:
Popos±tion1:Ify8 <y',then the cheapest way for B to get control is by
making a restricted offer at a price just above sty' for each security i. The
fractions asked for each of the securities, f*, are chosen to minimize the
3.
totalshare of the firm's profit stream, S*, that B must take up given that he
must accumulate a fraction uofthe corporation's votes. That is (ft,
n n
f*) minimizes f.s. subject to f.v. ￿u
n
1=1 i=1
We may apply Proposition 1 to the two examples considered above. Under
one share/one vote, s =v1
=1and so S =f
=u, whichequals .5 under
majority rule. On the other hand, given voting and nonvoting shares with
equal income claims (s1 =S2 = .5,v1 =1,V2= 0),f =, f=0and so S =
(i2),whichequals .25 under majority rule.
Proposition 1 tells us that if B y', the cost to B of getting control
(net of the market value of the income stream purchased) is S*(y1 —B)and so
B will only take control if
I B B
(4.5) S*(y —y)<z
In this event, security holders will be presented with the offer p =s1y'
(plus a penny), f1 =f*for each i, all will tender, and the take—up rate will
be f*• The total value of security i is then
f sy1 +(1—ft)18
and the total value of the firm is
I B T B (f* s.y +(1_f*)s.y ) =5*y +(1_S*)y
i=11 1 1 1
Wemay summarize our results so far as follows:
Prq1position_2.Inthe case of arbitrage resistance, if:
(a) yByl then B gets control and security holders receive yB;
B I lB B
(b) y ( y and S*(y —y )<z then B gets control and security
holders receive S*y1 +(l_S*)yB;
B I lB B
(c)y 'yand 5*(y —y )￿ zthen B does not get control and
security holders receive y'.
Thus, the total return (i.e., the market value of all the firins securities)
in the event that the incumbent and buyer characteristics are given by (y',
B B.
y ,z) is:
B . B I
y ify ￿y
(4.6) R*(y1, B zB) =S*y1+(l_S*)yB ,B <y'and S*(yI_yB) <
I . B I lB B
y if y (yand 3*(y -y ) ￿z
B I
Note that if y <yand control shifts to B, shareholders suffer from a bid
(since S*y1 +(l_S*)yB< y1). This is in spite of the fact that for all
securities the bid price exceeds s1y'.
It is clear from Proposition 2 that shareholder return is determined by
S. Furthermore, increases in S are good for shareholders since they make it
less likely that an inferior buyer wins control (S*(y1 B) <Bwill be19
satisfied by fewer zBs) and they reduce the loss to shareholders in the event
that this happens (Sk y' +(1_S*)y8is increasing in S*). We saw an
illustration of this above where one share/one vote yielded a higher value of
S than dual class shares and therefore protected shareholder value better.
Proposition 3 below shows that this conclusion generalizes: one share/one
vote protects shareholder value better than any other security structure. The
proposition follows directly from the following Lemma, which is proved in the
Appendix.
Lemma 4. S uwithequality if and only if there is one share/one vote
(i.e. (s1/v1) =... = (s/v)).
Lemma 4 says that any departure from one share/one vote allows a fractionof
the votes to be obtained with a purchase of less than a fraction uofprofits.
The reason is that if some votes have disproportionately large profit claims
assigned to them, others must have disproportionately small ones, and the
latter can always be purchased first.
Proposition 3: Suppose a voting rule uisgiven. Then the total market value
of the firm's securities (as given in (4.6)) will be higher under one
share/one vote than under any other security structure.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that tying shares to votes
intensifies the competition from the arbitrageurs against the buyer. Since
votes are valuable for the private benefit of control, while dividend shares
are valuable to those seeking to raise market value, the tie—in raises the
value of the votes to an arbitrageur and hence causes him to bid more
aggressively against the buyer: this leads the buyer to pay more for the20
votes. As a result, buyers who will tend to lower the market value of the
firm, and are attempting to purchase the firm for their own (private) benefit,
are more likely to be screened out.
Since most tender offers are not restricted, and since value—reducing
tender offers are virtually nonexistent (see, e.g. SEC (1985)), some further
comments on the role of such offers are necessary.
Note that a bidder for whom < y' can succeed in making a value—
reducing offer because he can offer a premium for only 50% of the shares, and
in effect give less than the status quo to the other 50%. If he had to pay
the same price for all 100% of the shares, then a successful value—reducing
offer would be impossible. In particular, if B is a corporation that desires
to merge with the target after purchasing 51%, then it would have to pay a
"fair value" for the other 49%. Even though the actual market value of the
income stream is y3, the minority shareholders of the target could demand an
appraisal and argue to a court that (a) the best estimate of the worth of the
company is the price paid for the other 51% of the shares by B, or (b) that
the firm was really worth y' prior to the offer and that is what they are
entitled to
The buyer could avoidall of these difficulties by not merging with the
target, but still maintaining voting control. A problem with this approach is
that the extraction of the private benefit from the target firm could
create conflict of interest litigation from the minority shareholders of the
target. Note, however, that if is not so large as to make a conflict of
interest undeniable, then a partial offer for 50% which reduces shareholder
value is feasible when < y'. It is difficult to know how the courts will
deal with these issues in the abstract, since no actual court case will have
all parties agreeing on the values of y', B, •andB In any event, even if
we assume partial offers for a share class are not feasible, it will still be21
the case that our propositions on the optimality of one share/one vote hold
true.
Finally, in the model of this Section, it is assumed that no party tries
to deter takeovers which are value—increasing. For this reason, the security
holders can only benefit from requiring that=1for a control change (by
Lemma 4, S* achieves a maximum of 1 under one share/one vote and u= 1).
Setting=1deters a value—decreasing bidder since he can no longer
profitably use a restricted offer at a premium to get control. The Appendix
proves an even stronger result:
Proposition 4: A corporate charter with one share/one vote and=1gives
security holders a higher total market value than any other security structure
and any other u.
Clearly,the problem with requiring a buyer to get all of the firm's
votes for control is that it can then be very easy for incumbent management,
or some group who wants to free ride on the improvement, to buy a small
fraction of the firm and block the bid. These points are taken up in the
following sections.22
5. RESISTANCE BY INCUMBENT MANAGEMENT
In the last section, we gave some arguments in favor of the one
share/one vote rule. The same arguments, however, led to the conclusion that
corporate charters should require a bidder to get 100% of the corporation's
votes to acquire control. Since such extreme voting rules are not observed in
practice, we consider in this and the next section how our analysis can be
modified to explain values ofless than one.
It seems plausible that the main disadvantage of a 100% rule (or
something close to it) is that it would make it too easy for a value—
increasing control bid to be blocked. We analyze this in two ways. In this
section, we explore the implications of managerial resistance ——asopposed to
arbitrageur resistance ——toa bid. In the next section we return to
arbitrageur resistance but allow the arbitrageur to block a bid with the
intention of negotiating later with the bidder for a share of the acquisition
gains.
We start with the case of managerial resistance.(For simplicity we now
ignore any other forms of resistance, e.g. by arbitrageurs.) Suppose B makes
a bid bB. Then in principle, incumbent management I is willing to make a
counterbid b' as long as I wins the resulting contest and the private benefit
from maintaining control is no smaller than the net cost of the counterbid.
(We assume that I would lose his private benefit if B takes control.) The
incumbent may finance the counterbid out of his own resources (e.g., a
leveraged buyout) or he may find a "friendly" firm to which the private
benefit z' can be transferred and who will make the counteroffer (i.e., a
"white knight"). We assume, however, that thecorporate charter prevents l's
112/
use of the corporation's assets for the purpose of maintaining z
This leads to the following:23
Definition. Let B make a bid bB. We say that this deters I if
(5.1) there does not exist a counterbid b' by I, such that in the
resulting contest between bB and b', there is an equilibrium
where I wins and does not make a net loss.
The notion of deterrence is almost the same as for the case of an
arbitrageur (see (4.3)). One difference is that I resists even if B's bid
raises security prices.
It follows from Lemma 1 that it never pays B to make a bid which
attracts a counterbid from I (since neither B nor I can make money from a
losing offer). Out of all the bids that deter I, let bB BB
f11..., f) maximize B s net profit. Then B will make a bid and gain control
whenever this maximized profit is nonnegative, and in this event the total
return to security holders is
(5.2). E (Max (5B, ?; + (1...B)5B) 13/
On the other hand, if B desn't take control, total return to security holders
is
It is fairly clear why in this framework ucloseto 1 will not generally
be optimal. Under these conditions, management need accumulate only a small
number of votes to block a bid. Given a positive private benefit z' of
retaining control, management is therefore prepared to pay a high price for
each of these votes, which makes it easy to outbid B. For example, under one
share/one vote, if y8 =55,z =9,y' =50and z' =2,then the highest price
per share that B can pay for 100u% is B =B+ whilethe highest price
that I is willing, to pay for 100 (1—)% is p1 =y1+z'/(l—cc).Thus, if the24
charter specified that B must get 90% to obtain control, then p3 =65,and p1
=70.Therefore, I can prevent B's value—increasing bid from succeeding. On
the other hand, if =.5,p8 =73and p1 =54so B would succeed against I,
and this is good for shareholders.
What drives the above example is that a rise in uputsrelatively more
weight on the incumbent's private benefit than on the buyer's. This focuses
the competition for control on the size of the buyer's private benefit
relative to that of the incumbent, rather than on size of the buyer's security
value relative to that of the incumbent.
In the above example, it is harmful to shareholders to put more weight
on I's private benefit since this deters a value—increasing offer. However,
sometimes I's private benefit can be used to increase competition for control
in a way that is in the shareholders' interest. In particular, a charter
which departs from one share/one vote may increase competition between the two
parties and give shareholders a larger share of the total surplus. We
illustrate this with an example.
Let B =too, =1.1,y' =10,and z' =1.This is a case where the
buyer will improve the target. With one share/one vote and u= , Bwill
offer to purchase all the shares at a price of 100. The incumbent cannot
resist this offer, since there is no way that he can tender for 50% of the
shares at a price anywhere near 100 and avoid substantial losses. Hence,
under one share/one vote, shareholders receive 100 for 100% of the
corporation. Now suppose that the charter specified two classes of
securities: security 1 has all the votes and none of the dividends (s =0,V1
= 1)while security 2 has all of the dividends and none of the votes =1,
=0).In order to deter I, the buyer must make an offer for 50% of the
votes (i.e., class 1) at a price per vote of just above 2.(An offer by B for
class 1 at a price of less than 2 will permit I to make a counteroffer for 50%25
at 2 which will defeat B and leave I with no net losses.) Thus class 1
security holders receive a total of (.5) (2) =1,while class 2 holders have
securities which are worth 100 under the control of B. Therefore, security
holders receive a total of 101 under a charter with voting and nonvoting
shares. For the chosen values of (yBzByIZI) this is better for security
holders than is one share/one vote.
The intuition underlying this example is the following. Both one
share/one vote and pure votes ensure that B gets control. Under one share/one
vote, however, the shareholders extract none of B's private benefit. The
reason is that in the competition over bundles of "public" benefit y and
private benefit z, B is sufficiently dominant relative to I that B can win by
paying only B. which is what shareholders get by free—riding anyway. In
contrast, under a pure votes system, the competition takes place over the pure
private benefit, and, since and z' are close, this leads to the extraction
of a large fraction of B's surplus.
To put it very simply, shareholders benefit when B and I compete over
products for which they have similar willingnesses to pay; in this example,
pure votes qualify better for this than shares and votes together.14"
The above example shows that when both parties have private benefits,
departures from one share/one vote can raise a firm's market value by allowing
shareholders to extract a greater fraction of these benefits. This surplus—
extraction effect will only be important, however, when B and z' are both
large. In situations where only one of them is significant, factors similar
to the ones analyzed in Section 4 will be relevant in determining optimal
financial structure.
To see this it is convenient to divide up the possible values of private
benefits into the following four categories, which are assumed to be mutually
exclusive and exhaustive. -26
B —B I ,,,
Case1: z =z 0, z =0 (B's private benefit large ,s small
Case 2: 0, z' =z (B's private benefit "small", I's "large")
B I Case 3: z =z=0 (both private benefits snail
Case 4: B =B>o,z' =) 0(both private benefits "large")
Here "large and "small" mean relative to the security benefits, and y'.
Let us analyze each of these possibilities in turn. Case 1 is just like
the situation studied in Section 4 since the resisting party's private benefit
is zero. The outcome for this case is therefore summarized by Proposition 2
and (4.6))" In particular, one share/one vote is good because it minimizes
the chance of an inferior buyer getting control and the loss to shareholders
in the event that this does happen.
Case 2 is the mirror—image of Case 1 in which I's private benefit is
significant, while B's is not. It is easy to extend the logic of Section 4 to
show that:
(A) Since B =0,the most effective bid by B is an unrestricted offer at SB
for all i (cf. Lemma 3).
(B) If )y',the cheapest way for I to resist this bid is to make a
restricted offer for a fraction f of security i at a price s.y8, where
f1,..., f minimize the total share of the firm's profit stream,S, that I
must take up given that he must accumulate a fraction (1—a) of the
corporation's votes to block B; i.e. (f1,..., f) minimizes
n n




costsIS(yB_yI) and so I will only make it if S(yB_yI) zI.27
(C) If y3 c y', B cannot win control since I can defeat him costless].y with an
unrestricted offer at sy' for each i.
From (A)—(C) it follows that:
(5.1) In Case 2, B gets control if B >y1and S(y3—y') >z';otherwise
I retains control. If B gets control, shareholder return is YB.
If I retains control, shareholder return is y'.'6'
(5.1) tells us that in Case 2 the corporation's security structure
affects shareholder return only through S. Clearly, increases in S are good
for shareholders since they make it more likely that a superior buyer (one
withy3 >y')gets control (the inequality S(yB_yI)z' is more likely to be
satisfied when S is large). The following lemma (which is a restatement of
Lemma 4) says that out of all possible security structures one share/one vote
yields the highest possible value of S.
Lemma 5. S(1—a) with equality if and only if there is one share/one vote
(i.e. (s1/v1) =.... = (s/v)).
It follows from Lemma 5 that one share/one vote is better than all other
security structures in Case 2 since it maximizes the probability of a superior
buyer winning control. The intuition is as in Section 4: tying votes to
shares increases the competition from the buyer against the incumbent.hhhl
An example may be useful here. Suppose there is one share/one vote and
majority rule, and y' =80,y3 =100.Then (A) tells us that the most
effective way for B to get control is by making an unrestricted offer at 100.
By (B), I's best response to this is a restricted offer for 50% of the shares28
at 100 (or just above). Such an offer will bring I victory, but at a capital
loss of (100—80). Hence, I will only be prepared to resist if z' ￿10.
Contrast this with what would happen with two classes of shares. Let
class 1 have all the votes and 50% of the income claims, while class 2 has 50%
of the income claims but no voting rights. Then to get control B will make an
unrestricted offer for the class 1 shares at (100) =50,while I's best
response is a restricted offer for 50% of these shares at 50. I's capital
loss is reduced to (50 —40)=5since he needs to buy up only 25% of the
firm's profit and so I will retain control as long as z' >5.This confirms
the idea that a departure from one share/one vote will increase the
probability of an inferior incumbent retaining control.
We turn now to the remaining cases, 3 and 4. Case 3 is in fact trivial
since, in the absence of private benefits, control goes to the party with the
highest market value. That is, if )y',B wins control with an
unrestricted offer at s.y3 for all (and I cannot afford to resist); while if
<y',I can defeat this offer with an unrestricted offer at sty' and so
retains control)8" It follows that in Case 3 security structure is
irrelevant. On the other hand, in Case 4 we have seen that one share/one vote
may not be optimal.
The results for Cases 1—3 can be summarized as follows:
Summary. With managerial resistance:
B I B I I
(1) In Case 1: B gets control if (a) y ￿y ,or(b) y < y and S*(y —
B B
y )z; otherwise I retains control. Under (a),
B I B
shareholder return is y ; under (b) it is S*y +(1_S*)y.;
if I retains control, it is y'.29
(2) In Case 2: B gets control if > andS(yB —y')>z';otherwise I
retains control. If B gets control, shareholder return is
y3. If I retains control, shareholder return is y'.
(3) InCase3: B gets control if >y',while I retains control if y
y. For a particular realization (Yl, shareholder
return is the larger of y' and
Evidently, if Cases 1—3 were the only ones ever to occur, one share/one
vote would be optimal. Shareholders like high values of S (in Case 1) and S
(in Case 2) since this makes it more difficult for an "undesirable" party to
take or remain in control. Under one share/one vote, S =u andS =(1—a)
where uisthe plurality, and so the feasible set is S +S=1.Under any
other security structure, however, S +S<1(by Lemmas 4 and 5) and so the
feasible set is strictly inferior; in particular any feasible (S*, S) can be
dominated by one from the one share/one vote feasible set. In Case 4,
however, one share/one vote nay not maximize market value and so if this case
occurs sufficiently often relative to the others, the optimal charter may
depart from one share/one vote.
How important is the surplus—extraction effect in Case 4 likely to be
empirically? Yhile it is possible that it can sometimes explain observed
departures from one share/one vote, our feeling is that in a large class of
cases it is likely to be swamped by the other two effects. As support for
this position, note that while the private benefits z3, z' may sometimes be
large (relative to B y'), legal doctrines of "fiduciary responsibility" and
"fairness" will prevent them from being large very frequently. In particular,
unless the corporate charter explicitly permits the majority to derive
significant benefits from control (via the types of dilution discussed in
Grossman—Hart [1980]), minority shareholders can assert and perfect claims30
against the private benefits enjoyed by the majority. Of course, the courts
cannot always be relied upon to ensure that the majority and minority enjoy
equal treatment, so the entrepreneur in writing a charter must take into
account the possibility that will sometimes be large.
Suppose that for the above reasonsB will be small with high
probability. Then Cases 1 and 4 will be very infrequent relative to Cases 2
and 3, and so the reason for deviating from one share/one vote will be absent.
Further, it is never desirable to raiseabovesince this makes it easier
for the incumbent to resist a value increasing offer. (To put it another way,
the optimal value of uinCase 2 is u= .) Hencethe Appendix establishes:
Proposition 5: If the probability that z' >0is bounded away from zero, and
the probability that z 0 is sufficiently small, then
and one share/one vote yield a strictly higher expected
security return than any other security structure and u•
Inour model, the incumbent resists B's offer by (directly or
indirectly) becoming a large shareholder. As a large shareholder, he may not
be able to use the "business judgment" rule to resist suits demanding that he
return the private benefit z' to security holders. In such cases thez' which
is relevant for managerial resistance may be small in similar situations to
those in which B is small; in particular, the probability thatz' is
significant may be small. We can still prove the optimality of one share/one
vote in such circumstances as long as the probability thatz8 and z' are
simultaneously large is negligible (this means that Case 4 can be ignored).
However, majority rule need no longer be optimal.31
Assume that there is a positive probability that y' <y+z3
given that =o, = andB y'. Assume that the
probability of the events in Case 4 is negligible relative to
the probability of the events in Cases 1 and 2. Then: given
any security structure (s1 ,S V1v)with s/v 1
for all i, and a plurality u, c 1, one share/one vote
and the pluralityyield a strictly higherexpectedreturn.
A situation where the conditions of Proposition 6 are satisfied is if
B, z', B y' are mutually independent random variables and Prob tzB = =
Prob = =, wheret is small. However, more general cases where large
z's tend to imply low y's (because a lot of profit is being siphoned off) are
consistent with the proposition.
Proposition 6 demonstrates the desirability of the one share/one vote
rule for some plurality u.However,it does not tell us anything about the
magnitude of .Increasesinraise shareholder return in Case 1 by reducing
the likelihood, and mitigating the consequences, of value—decreasing bids;
while decreases inraise shareholder return in Case 2 by reducing the
likelihood that an inefficient incumbent remains in place. The optimal value
of u,denotedby u*,willbe determined by which of these two effects is more
important; this in turn depends on the joint probability distribution of y',
B z', z3. It is easy to construct examples showing that omaybe bigger
1 than -.32
6. BARGAINING FOR A SHARE OF THE CONTROL BENEFITS
So far we have considered situations where a party makes a counterbid to
permanently block the buyer from taking control. We now consider the case
where an arbitrageur takes advantage of the voting rule to buy enough shares
to threaten to block the buyer and thereby bargain for a share of the buyer's
gains. For example, if the corporate charter specifies that a change in
control requires 90% approval of shareholders, then an arbitrageur can
purchase 11% of the votes and threaten to block any buyer. We assume that if
the buyer does not choose a high enough tender price to discourage the entry
of an arbitrageur, he will have to share the takeover gains with him. This
has the effect of raising the price that the buyer must pay to acquire
control.
In the model of Section 4, security holders desire a corporate charter
which forces a buyer to purchase 100% of the company. However, under the new
assumption about arbitrageur behavior, this need not be in the security
holders' interest since such a rule makes it very easy for an arbitrageur to
block the offer and demand a share of the gains. Even a buyer who would raise
the value of the firm might find that the cost of deterring the entry of an
arbitrageur is sufficiently high that he is discouraged from making an offer.
Hence, we are able to explain values of u1.In particular, we prove that
if the buyer's private benefit is small, then the optimalis eitheror 1.
Further, for any private benefit, if buyers always raise the value of the firm
to security holders then the optimalis never larger than .Inany case,
as the buyer's private benefit gets smaller, the optimalgets closer to
These results are obtained under the assumption of a one share/one vote
security structure; we believe, however, that the main ideas generalize to
arbitrary security structures.
The model has the same structure as in the previous sections, except33
that after the buyer (B) makes an offer for aofthe votes, the arbitrageur
(A) can make an offer for 1 —a•IfA gets 1 —a, thenB must negotiate with
A for control. We assume that the outcome of the negotiations is that the
gains from control are divided equally between the parties. That is,
(6.1) each party gets the status quo value of his shares plusof the
total gain created by the acquisition.1'
For example, suppose the charter specifies that a change in control requires a
favorable vote of 100 a= 70%of the shareholders, and that there is a one
share/one vote security structure (as noted, we assume this throughout this
section). Suppose the status quo value (i.e., the value under the incumbent)
is y' =100,and B can make the firm's shares worthy8 =200.Further,
suppose B will realize private value B =20.In order to get the
shareholders to tender their shares, B must make an offer of at least 200.
Suppose he makes such an offer. Let A make a counteroffer to shareholders at
a price just above 200 (say 201) for 30% of the shares. Since A is offering
more than B, he will get just above 30% of the shares and have the ability to
block B. Now, A and B negotiate and agree to split the gains from the
takeover as in (6.1). The gain created by the takeover is the private value
=20plus the appreciation in the value of the shares y3 —y1200 —100=
100.Hence
A gets (.3)y' +(z8+y8—y')=90
B gets (.7)y' +(zB+B—y1)=130
Note that these numbers represent gross benefits; they do not take into
account the sunk cost of acquiring the shares. Indeed the acquisition costs34
are (.3) (201) =60.3for A and (.7)(200) =140for B. Thus, in net, B loses
money on the bid. Of course, B will anticipate this, i.e., he will not be
willing to make an offer for 70% at a price of 200 per 100%. However, since
shareholders must be offered at least 200 to get them to tender rather than
hold on to their shares, there is no cheaper winning bid and B is simply
discouraged from entering. This has the negative consequence of preserving
the status quo.
Now consider the effect of lowering ato.5 (i.e., majority rule). If A
purchases just over .5, then his share of the gains is (.5)y' +(.5)(zB +y3—
y')=(.5)(100)+(.5)(120)=110,and, of course, B receives an equal share.
IfB makes an offer for 50% of the shares at a price just above 220 per 100%,
then it will be too costly for A to enter the bidding (he must offer above 220
for 50% which costs him above 110, and is larger than his share of the gains).
The offer by B deters A from entering and competing against him. With A
absent, B gets 50% of the shares at a total cost just above 110, and this is
worth 120, composed of B =20and the value of the shares (.5) (200). Note
that once B makes a sufficiently high offer that A is deterred, then B does
not have to share his private benefit with A. Under B's offer, the target's
shares are worth (.5) (220) +(.5)(200) =210,which is much larger than their
worth under a 70% rule.
We may summarize this example as follows. When the charter deviates
from majority rule, then for a given offer price of the buyer, the
arbitrageur's cost of threatening to block the buyer is lowered. Hence, the
buyer must raise his tender price to deter A's entry. A sufficiently large
deviation from majority rule lowers the cost to A of blocking to the point
where B would only suffer losses from a successful offer. This can occur even
with an' offer which, if completed, would raise the market value of the firm,
because a deviation from majority rule gives A both more than his pro rata35
share of Bs private benefit and more than his pro rata share of the public
gains from improving the company. That is, given that the cost of shares
purchased is sunk, B cannot be expected to recover the relatively high cost of
purchasing >insubsequent bargaining with an arbitrageur who has had to
purchase only (1—u) <
Toelaborate on and generalize the above discussion, note that there are
2 cases to consider: Case (1) is where + >y', so that if A and B
together own 100%, it is optimal for them to replace the incumbent; and Case
(2) is where yB +zBc y' and it is not optimal to replace the incumbent. In
Case (1) note that if the voting rule requires B to get uforcontrol, and B
makes an offer at a sufficiently low price that A enters to purchase 1 —
thenA will get
(6.2) (1 —u)y'+1(B +B—
grossof the cost of acquiring 1 —u• Inorder to deter A from entering, the
tender price P must be such that (1 —u)Pis just larger than (6.2), i.e.,
-BBI
(6 3) P — +
2(1—u)
This yields a profit to B of uB+B—up,i.e.,
(6.4) B's profit = {2u(B_I) [u] + 3z3[ufl.
Inthe case where (6.4) is positive, a bid will take place and the firm
will have a market value of uP +(l.u)yB.Using (6.3) to eliminate P, we
conclude that shareholder return satisfies36
B B I (cc(2u—1)B B I B B
If +z>'thenr() +z-Y)+ uz+y
(6.5) when B's profit is positive,
y' when B's profit is negative.
Examination of (6.5) shows that shareholders prefer a higher uaslong as it
doesn't drive B's profit negative (since a higher uraisesthe tender price
and the amount purchased). From (6.4), j YB > yl, then B's profit is
negative if >. Itfollows that there will be no bids in this case if u>
IfyB <y',the analysis is somewhat more involved, and u>maybe






If < then x )1.It can be shown that B's profit is zero at anwhich
we denote by (x) where
4x—1— i(1+8x)
(6.7) (x) =—--Th:1i ,
andfurther, when >(x),B's profit is negative for realizations of (y
I B —'B—B B 1 2/
y ,z) such that x = z/(y +z—y) (x. Therefore in Case (1), if
shareholders knew that <xfor sure they would never choose u) u(x).
B
Examination of (6.6) and (6.7) shows that as z goes to zero, u(x) goes to
Further, by evaluating (6.7), we see that: if x =1,then <u(1)=ifx =
2then u< u(2)=.72;if x =3,then <(3)=.75,etc.
In Case 2 where +y8c y', then B need not worry about deterring A,
since if B accumulates uandA accumulates 1 —u, theywill find it in their
mutual interest to keep the incumbent in power; hence there will be no
benefits to divide. In this case the best offer for B is one for lOOu% at a
price of y'. This yields:37
B B I
(6.8) Bsprofit=y +z —y
and the shareholder return satisfies:
B I.
ocy +(1-u)yif B s profit
B B I
(6.9) If z +yc y then r() = ispositive.
yl if B's profit
is negative.
A crucial feature of this case is that changes in control are not in the
shareholder's interest. Further, when a is raised above 50%, there are fewer
values of B YI for which B can make a profitable bid and in the cases
where a profitable bid is made shareholders receive a higher return (since a
higher a leads to more shares taken up at the premium tender price; cf.
Section 4).
These results allow us to establish the following:
Proposition 7: The corporate charter will specify a voting rule for control
changes a, which is either (a) sufficiently high so that no control change can
occur without the incumbent's approval or (b) lies betweenand a(x) where x
is the largest possible ratio of private benefits to total acquisition
1 benefits. In Case (b), if x1 then itisoptimal to choose an a between
and .Further,in case (b) if z is sure to be less than b, then as
tends to zero, a tends to ,i.e.,in the limit we have majority rule.
This result follows from the fact that to the extent that Case (2)
obtains (i.e., the incumbent is more productive than the buyer) shareholders
want to prevent control changes, while in Case (1) shareholders never need to
choose a larger than a(x) to discourage control changes, and indeed would want
alessthan u(x) to encourage beneficial control changes.38
7. FURTHER REMARKS
A. More Complex Securities
So far we have analyzed the optimal voting structure in a contextwhere
all claims to income are proportional, i.e., each security is characterized by
a share "s" of profit. We have thus excluded debt, warrants,convertible
debentures, etc. To incorporate such securities in the model wewould have to
th
consider non—linear sharing rules, say which give the isecuritya function
of total profit y. It can be shown that if these functions are
restricted to be non—decreasing in profit, then (if private benefits are
small) an optimal voting/security structure will consist of a combinationof
riskless debt and one share/one vote common stock.
Another restrictive assumption made is that the charter specifies voting
rights to be independent of future information. This excludes riskydebt
where a default event shifts control (i.e. votes) from equity holders todebt
holders. It also excludes non—voting preferred shares which obtain voting
rights consequent to a series of low dividend payments. A careful analysisof
such state contingent voting rights would involve studying a multiperiod
model, and this is deferred to future work. However we think that thebasic
principle which we have identified will still apply: tieing votes toshares
on a one to one basis is most likely to cause control toshift to an outsider
who will raise the market value of the firm.
The above draws attention toa further restrictive assumption, namely
that the voting/security structure -is responsible for allocating control,
while the managerial compensation scheme is responsible for assuring that
management maximizes profit to the best- of its ability. In reality,the
allocation of control and the managerial compensation scheme are not39
completely separable. An entrepreneur who sets up a corporation will make
various investments of time and other resources, for which adequate
compensation may be impossible unless the entrepreneur possesses the residual
rights inherent in control." For this reason, parties to the initial
capitalization of the corporation will try to allocate control changes in a
manner which is as sensitive to public information as is feasible. For
example, in the case of debt, the contract will explicitly define default
events in which failure to make an immediate payment in full will shift
control from management to debt holders. Presumably, the award of ordinary
voting rights, which, independent of a default event, would allow the debt
holders to achieve control gives insufficient protection to the entrepreneur
(and possibly other security holders) relative to its benefits.2'
B. More Complex Takeover Bids
Our analysis has considered takeover bids which involve specifying a
price per share and a total number of shares which the offeror is willing to
accept. There are more complicated offers which are theoretically feasible.
For example, in the case of one share/one vote, the acquirer could offer to
pay a high price per share if he gets less than alpha, and a low price per
share if he gets more than alpha. In such a case the acquirer could win at
the low price, since if everyone thinks that he will get less than alpha, then
they tender shares to him, and it is thus not an equilibrium for him to get
less than alpha. Depending on the particular type of competition among
bidders it is possible that a one share/one vote security structure loses its
ability to protect shareholder property rights and to allocate control to a
high value bidder. However, other security structures will not do better.
We have assumed throughout that it is illegal or infeasible to sell
votes separated from shares. If an investment bank could profitably unbundle40
votes from shares, and repackage a firm's security/voting structure, then
security holders would not be able to protect themselves from high private
benefit but low security benefit acquisitions.3" However the opening of a
market in votes appears to be illegal; see Easterbrook and Fischel (1983).
In Section 5, we considered how the surplus—extraction role of the
security/voting structure can be in conflict with the al].ocational role in the
presence of private benefits possessed by the incumbent or the acquiror. Our
analysis and results would be essentially unchanged if, instead of considering
competition between the acquiror and the incumbent, we had considered
competition between two acquirors.4"
8. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude with some remarks as to the relevance of our model to the
current policy debate as to whether a corporation should be required to have a
one share/one vote security structure as a condition for listing on various
physical or electronic stock exchanges. First, our results show that
deviations from one share/one vote can be a characteristic of a corporate
charter which is in security holders' best interest. We thus see no reason to
interfere with the ability of a new company to choose a corporate charter and
security structure which gives it the lowest cost of raising capital.
Our analysis has not, however, dealt with the issue of a change in the
security/voting structure by an old company which has a one share/one vote
charter. Nevertheless, we would view such a change with suspicion. If such a
corporation changes its structure so that incumbent management is entrenched
and isolated from the market for corporate control, then our result that one
share/one vote is generally in security holders' interest, and the fact that
managerial entrenchment is in the managers' self interest, leads us to believe
that it is possible that security holders will be harmed. We would hold this42
reason why traders cannot obtain information elsewhere regarding the voting
structure of the firm. But we also see no reason why an Exchange should be
prevented from specializing in the trading of shares with a particular voting
structure if it wishes to do this.5'
To the extent that ex—post changes in security/voting structure should
receive further regulation, then, instead of regulating listing requirements,
it would seem more appropriate to award dissenting rights to shareholders of
the type that they already have in mergers, or other asset sales. In
particular, dissenting shareholders could be given rights of appraisal which
would allow them to attempt to show that the value of their holdings has
fallen under the proposed change in security/voting structure.41
view even if a majority (or 2/3) of shareholders voted for the change. The
role of the market for corporate control derives from the fact that it is
generally optimal for small shareholders to vote with management, and not
devote the time and effort to read proxy statements and form an independent
view. Hence, the fact that shareholders vote for a withdrawal from the
corporate control market is no defence of management's position.
The above observation may apply with less force to a corporation where
management already holds a majority of the votes, and wants to change the
voting structure so that it may hold fewer shares of profit, yet still
maintain voting control. For example, a family may desire to raise capital
for other projects, or to diversify some of its wealth out of a company which
it founded. Such a family does not necessarily want to sell its shares, since
this would entail a loss of voting control, so it separates its shares from
its votes by creating a class of shares with lower dividend claims but higher
votes than common shares. To the extent that initial shareholders expected
management to maintain voting control, then this change in security structure
is consistent with the original desire of security holders to isolate the
company from the corporate control market, and hence should not beinterfered
with. Of course, this conclusion would not be valid if shareholders'
expectations were instead that management would sell its combined shares and
votes at this point and relinquish control.
Even if it is undesirable to allow post changes in security/voting
structures, this has no particular implication for legislation regarding
listing requirements. An Exchange's listing requirements are an attempt to
provide information to traders about the characteristics of the securities
being traded. (Until recently, a trader of shares on the New York Stock
Exchange would know, merel" from the fact that the firm was trading on the
NYSE, that all equity of the company had one share/one vote.) We see no43
APPENDIX
We begin by defining an equilibrium when there is a contest between two
bidders (see Section 4). Denote the bids by (p,..., PB; f...., f) and
(p,..., p; f,..,, fe), where o stands for opposition (o =Aor I).
Faced with these two bids, a holder of security i has three choices. He
can tender to B, earning a return p on those securities taken up and s1y on
those returned where W is the winner of the subsequent voting contest; he can
tender -to 0, earning a return p0 on those securities taken up and s1y on
those returned; or he can hold on to his shares, earning a return of s
Under rational expectations, each investor is supposed to be able to forecast
the total amounts tendered to B and ,XB,x0, and the ultimate winner, W, and
thus determine which of these choices is best (note that there is no aggregate
uncertainty). This leads to the following definition of equilibrium.
Definition. Given the bids bB =B pB; f) and b° =(p,...,
'::"'f°),an equilibrium consists of a vector ((x9, x°) i =1,...,n),
where x is the fraction of security i tendered to j (j =B,0),and a winner
W=B or 0 of the subsequent voting contest, such that:
(1) x,x￿0, xB+x?i (foralli);
B B
B o B B
(2) (x1, x1) solves: maximize x1{p1 mm (-j l)+sY max (1— OH Ba x. x.
(x1,x)
i i
+ ? mm(—,1)+s.y max C]. — , 0)
+(1—— x)sy (for all i),44
subject t,o x ￿0,x ￿0,x +x
1, where y0 =y';
(3)If .mm(f3, ;B) v. ￿
1 3. 1
thenW =B;otherwise W =0.
(2) says that shareholders' tender decisions are profit maximizinggiven
their expectations about the outcome of the control contest and giventhe fact
that since they are small they will have a negligible effect onthis outcome
(note that since all security holders face the samemaximization problem, we
can consider just the representative securityholder). (3) tells us who wins
the subsequent voting contest.
It is worth noting that in some circumstances there canbe multiple
equilibria in a voting contest; in particular, B maywin if he's expected to,
while 0 may if he's expected to. However, there are nostochastic equilibria,
since if B is expected to win with some probability, thisleads to
deterministic tender decisions (xB, x°.) in the aggregate and hence, by(3),
to a deterministic winner B or 0. There may also be caseswhere there is no
equilibrium at all.
It is straightforward to compute the profits of B and 0from the bidding
contest. Let =1if V =j, =0otherwise. Then B and 0's profits are:
BB o n . B B V BWB
(4) ir(b ,b) = mm(f ,x1) (s y —p
+BZ
(5) w° (bB, b°) =ilmm (f? ,x°) (s V —p°) +xz0,
since each unit of security i tendered to j costs 4andis worth s yV
is clear from (2) that if 4( sy, the rate of return to investors from
tendering to j is less than that from holding on tosecurity i, and so x =0.45
It follows that




which proves Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Observe that B's profit in the absence of a counter—bid by
Ais
(7) =il
f ?lin (s.yB —, +
sinceall of security i will be tendered to B if syB p and none if SYB >





Proáf of Lemma 3. Necessity is clear since makes zero profit if A wins
(and an equilibrium can easily be shown to exist in the bB —Acontest). To
establish sufficiency, suppose not, i.e. while b3 wins against it doesn't
win against another bid hA, which makes nonnegative profit for A. Without
loss of generality we can assume p ￿s1y'
for all i, since otherwise A gets
none of security i tendered to him in the V =Aequilibrium (investors will
free—ride). Also p' > s.y' and Mm (f, x) > 0 is inconsistent with A's
profit being nonnegative, and so we may suppose p =sty'for all i. But this
means that hA is the same bid as but with restrictions. It follows
immediately that if V =Ais an equilibrium in the (bB, A) contest, it is
also one in the (bB, b1') contest. Contradiction. Q.E.D.46
Proof of Proposition 1. We establish first that the bid p3 =s1y'
+ E, f. =
f.*will deter A. By Lemma 3, it is enough to show that this bid will win
against .Tosee this, note that since B is offering slightly more for each
security i, he must get at least what he asks for, i.e. x ￿ f1*•(If x (
tendering to B is a dominant strategy and so =1.)But it follows
that B will accumulate at leastvotes and will win any voting contest
against A; therefore W =B.
We establish next that any bid b3 that deters A costs B more thanS*(y1
—B)By Lemma 3, bB must win against
Let I =hip3> s.y' and f ) 01. Then .fv. ￿ since, otherwise,
1 1 1 1EI 11
in a contest with bA, there is an equilibrium in which the holders of all
securities i E I tender to A,and B has less thanvotes and loses. Given
that bB does deter A, B's profit is given by
—B B B B B B B B B
=fi(sty — + mm x) (sty —
+z
Note that s1y3 > p =>x
=0.Hence the second term is nonpositive and so
—B B B I B
ir(j1fs)(y —y)+z
S (YB - +
sinceJ1fV1 ￿u =)ifV￿ S. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since f1 =... = f=u isfeasible in the minimization
problem described in Proposition = u, whichproves the first
part of the claim. To prove the second part, note that the first order
conditions for the linear programming problem imply that the solution cannot47
be interior unless (s1/v1) =... = (sly). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. It follows from (4.6) that market value is increasing
in S*. Now apply Lemma 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. The result follows directly from the fact that S
achieves a maximum of 1 uniquely under one share/one vote and u= 1(see Lemma
4). Q.E.D.
Before establishing Propositions 5 and 6, it is necessary to be precise
about themeaning of sufficiently small and negligible. Let the probabilities
ofthe four cases in Section 5 be ir1(t), i2(t), ir3(t), 4(t), respectively,
where t is a parameter. Suppose also that 1r(t) is continuous in t for all i
and that the distribution of (y', z, y8, zB) conditional on Case j occurring
is independent of t for all j.
Proposition 5: Assume that ir1(t), i-4(t) —) 0 as t —) 0, but that T2(t) is
bounded away from zero. Suppose also that (*) Prob tz1 ( (B_I) B =
I—IBI. 1 z =z,y> y 3 is strictly increasing in ,0
-.Thenthe following
is true for small enough t: given any combination of a security structure
(Si,..., s; v1,..., v) and plurality u,witheither (s/v)1 for some i
or u> one share/one vote and u=yieldsa strictly higher expected
return than this combination.
Proof. Take limits as t —> 0. Then only Cases 2 and 3 are relevant. In Case
3, security structure does not affect shareholder return. In Case 2, one
share/one vote and=yieldsa strictly lower value of S than any other48
security structure and plurality (by Lemma 5 and (*)), and hence a higher
return to security—holders. The result follows. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6: Assume that there is a positive probability thaty' < +
giventhat = = and y'. Assume also that (ir4(t)/ir1(t)) —> 0,
(w4(t)/ir2(t)) —) 0 as t —) 0. Then the followingis true for small enough t:
given any security structure (s1,..., s; v19...1 v) with s1/v
1 for some
i, and a plurality , u1, one share/one vote and the pluralityyield
a strictly higher expected return.
Proof. Take limits as t —> 0. Then Case 4 becomes negligible relative to
Cases 1, 2 and 3. A move to one share/one vote (keepingconstant) strictly
increases S and S and hence raises shareholder return in Cases 1 and2 (in
Case 1, strictly). Shareholder return in Case 3 is unaffected.The result
follows. Q.E.D.49
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION 1
1/ Fischel (1986, p.16) notes that large shareholders have better
incentives to monitor management than do small shareholders and that
"one share/one vote recognizes this economic reality by assigning votes
and thus the ability to monitor managers, in direct proportion to
shareholders' stake in the venture". DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985, p.37)
recognize that a one share/one vote rule does not assign effective votes
in direct proportion to shares, since under majority rule sømeone with
50.1% of the shares has 100% of the effective votes.
2/ See Manne (1965) and Harris (1964).
3/ We therefore ignore proxy fights as a means for an outsider to get
control. However proxy fights do sometimes occur; see Dodd and Warner
(1983)
4/ It should be noted that ours is not the first attempt to develop a
formal model of security structure. Blair, Gerard and Golbe (1986) also
construct a model of the relationship between security structure and
takeover bids. However, they exclude private benefits of control and
find that security structure is irrelevant in the absence of taxes.
5/ It should be noted that voting rights are most important to security
holders who are not promised a particular payout, but instead a claim to
discretionary payments. Thus, our theory excludes default free debt,
and preferred stock issues which are equivalent to such debt.
Similarly, another deviation from one share/one vote involves mutual
insurance companies, banks, and investment funds, where the takeover bid
mechanism cannot operate to effect control changes. In such firms, the50
types of activities engaged in are more severely circumscribed by
charter provisions than is the case in the typical common stock
corporation. This, combined with industry regulation and competition
reduces somewhat the discretionary character of the payments given to
security holders. See 1ayers and Smith (1986) for an analysis of mutual
vs stock insurance companies.
6/ See Eisenberg (1976) for a discussion of fiduciary responsibility, and
Fischel (1983) for a discussion of the appraisal remedy and of
Weinberger v. UOP.
7/ Indeed there is a growing body of evidence that acquirers in hostile
takeovers do not significantly benefit from the acquisition; see Jensen
and Ruback (1983, p.22).
8/ The private benefits may have been created by sunk investments of
managerial effort, and hence may represent a return to these activities
which the initial security holders were willing to pay for.
9/ If a compensation agreement were used when private benefits are large,
the compensation ("golden parachute") would have to be large. Clearly,
compensation which is a significant percentage of the market value
creates moral hazards which might lead the incumbent to induce a control
change even if it did not raise market value. More to the point, the
best compensation rule would involve giving the incumbent a share of
market value, but when the private benefits are large this has negative
risk bearing consequences, and hence can be a very costly method of
inducing the incumbent to allow the market to decide who should have
control.51
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTIONS 2 -5
1/ If u( , asituation can arise where two or more parties have enough
votes to choose manaqement. In order to avoid such an ambiguous
situation, we constrainto be at least half.
2/ We assume that voting rights matter only because of their role in
determining the corporation's management. Lease, McConnell, and
Mikkelson (1984, p.451) have pointed out that possession of voting
rights may subject the holder to legal claims from shareholders without
voting rights; we ignore this possibility.
3/ We take (y, z) to be exogenous for B and I. In a richer model (y, z)
would depend on managerial actions and would be endogenous (for an
analysis of managerial agency problems in the presence of takeover bids,
see Scharfstein (1986)).
4/ There is another equilibrium where shareholders think that the buyer
will succeed with an offer of 5 and tender to him; each shareholder
correctly expecting success knows that his shares will be worth y8 =3
if he does not tender, while if he does tender he has a chance of
getting 5. As we will see in the next Section, this "equilibrium" will
disappear when some shareholder can act as an arbitrageur and preserve
the status quo by making a counteroffer at 100 per share.
5/ If we do not include the possibility of arbitrageur entry, then security
structure make no difference at all. As noted in Footnote 4, there
is an equilibrium where the low value buyer succeeds because all
shareholders think that he will succeed even under one share/one vote.
That is, shareholder competition can be ineffective. The existence of
the arbitrageur will eliminate many of these "multiple equilibria"52
problems.
6/ This is the free rider problem discussed in Grossman—Hart (1980). Note
that we ignore the possibility that the corporate charter explicitly
allows a successful bidder to dilute minority shareholder property
rights by diverting company profits to himself, e.g. in the form of
salary (the private benefits z do, however, represent an implicit
dilution of such property rights). However, see Demsetz (1983) on the
existence of large shareholders and Vishny and Shleifer (1986) on their
role in reducing the free—rider problem.
7/ See Fishman (1986) for a model of preemptive bidding under asymmetric
information.
8/ If =0,B is indifferent between taking control and not; we assume
that he does take control.
9/ We assume that the transactions cost to A of making the bid is
sufficiently small to be ignored (alternatively, the preoffer shares
held by A go up in value by enough to cover the transaction cost).
10/In fact if B's offer price is 101, say, the equilibrium involves a
fraction x tendering their shares to B where
101 +(1— 80=100,
(i.e., x =10/21);here the right—hand side is the value of tendering to
A and the left—hand side is the value of tendering to B.
11/See Fischel (1985) for a review of the appraisal remedy. In the U.K.,
the London Stock Exchange's Panel on Take—overs and Mergers restricts
the ability of a buyer to deviate from paying the same price for all
100% of the shares; see Roell (1986). Note, however, that to the extent
a buyer can always engage in some open market purchases prior to a53
tender offer it is impossible to eliminate a buyer's ability to pay more
per share for some shares than for others.
12/Contests between incumbent management and an outsider have been analyzed
in different contexts by Harris—Raviv (1985) and Blair, Gerard and Golbe
(1986). See also Baron (1983) and Stein (1986) for a discussion of
other forms of managerial resistance.
13/Note that if p (s.y3,no class i shareholder tenders and the value of
class i shares is
14/The reader may wonder whether greater competition between B and I could
also be generated by sticking to one share/one vote and raisingabove
This is indeed the case in this example (set u= 99%);however, more
complicated examples can be constructed where departures from one
share/one vote are desirable even whenis set optimally.
15/The only possible difference between this case and Section 4 is that I,
unlike A, might try to block a value—increasing bid. However such bids
only occur when B >y'(see Proposition 1) and, under these conditions,
I cannot afford to block since this would require him to purchase
securities at 5B which are only worth s1y' to him (I's private benefit
is zero).
16/One difference between this case and the preceding one should be noted.
In Section 4, when B obtained control in spite of being inferior for
shareholders (i.e. B <y,the market value of the firm fell, but not
all the way to y (in fact to S*y1 +(l_S*)yB);the reason is that B had
to disgorge some of his private benefit to deter A. In the present
case, when I retains control in spite of being inferior, the market
value of the firm is y', i.e. I is not forced to disgorge any ofz'.
The asymmetry is caused by our assumption that B moves first and only
makes an offer if he can win; hence when I retains control, he does so54
by default ——Bwill not even bother to make a bid. An alternative
approach, which would preserve symmetry, is to suppose that in order to
retain control I must make an offer which deters B.
17/One difference from Section 4 is that one share/one vote does not reduce
shareholders' loss in the event that a superior buyer fails to win
control. The reason for this is explained in footnote 16.
18/The one exception to this statement occurs when there is a security
B I
consisting of pure votes (s =0),in which case s1y =sy
.This
structure is inferior to all others in Case 3, however, and so will be
disregarded.
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION 6
1/ See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) for an explicit model of
bargaining where this is the "subgame perfect equilibrium" outcome
Such a model assumes that the two parties receive the flow of benefits
under the status quo while they bargain, and that after they agree on a
division of the gains, the incumbent is removed. Note that B cannot
just call an election and expect A to vote for him for free, because it
is assumed that A knows that if he votes against B, then there will be
another round of bargaining where B will offer A money for his shares.
2/ To see this, write (6.4) as
EBI
B's profit =(——)(( u)+ x(1—u)2],
Note for uthisis decreasing in ,and(6.7) gives thesuch that
) ÷ x(1—o)2 =0.Further in Case (1), B's profit is negative if
x<x and> o(x).55
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTIONS 7 AND 8
1/ See Grossman and Hart (1986) for an analysis of the determinants of the
allocation of control rights.
2/ See Aghion and Bolton (1986), and Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a
discussion of this and some related points.
3/ Conversely, if a corporation had a suboptimal voting/security structure
an investment bank could profitably repackage the securities and votes
to be in the form of one share/one vote.
4/ One difference is that setting alpha > .5 would make the model closer to
Section 6 than to Section 5. The reason is that the latter model
assumes that the acquisition of (1 —alpha)by one of the bidders
entitles him to the private benefits of control. This makes sense when
we interpret one of the bidders as the incumbent, but does not make
sense if neither bidder is the incumbent. The results on the optimality
of one share/one vote would remain unchanged.
5/ See Gordon (1986) for an alternative point of view, however.56
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